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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. L. BEARD, ELDON L. SUTHER-LAND, and VERNON LEHR
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
WHITE, GREEN and ADDISON ASSOCIATES, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case
No. 8865

vs.

E. B. YAKES
Defendant and Respondent.,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
FACTS OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from the order of the Trial
Court denying the motion of White, Green and Addison
Associates, Inc., to Quash Officer's Return of Process
and to set Aside Decree and Writ of Possession. Plaintiffs had commenced in the District Court of San Juan
County, Utah, an action for eviction and to quiet title
to certain mining claims. Process was served at Denver,
Colorado, on October 2, 1956, on a Richard J erris, alleged
to be the field manager and agent of Defendant, vVhite,
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. A default was entered by the Clerk of the Court on the 31st of October,
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1.956, no answer or other pleading having been filed by
Defendant, White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc.
On March 18, 1957, Defendant, White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., was allegedly served with an
Answer and a Cross-complaint wherein Defendant, E.
B. Yakes, asked that the lease of White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc. be cancelled and that title to certain
mining claims be quieted as against VVhite, Green and
Addison Associates, Inc.
The original return of service was amended to
specify the particular papers served. On April16, 1957,
the Clerk of the Court, upon the request of the Defendant, E. B. Yakes, entered a default against White, Green
and Addison Associates, Inc. on the Cross-complaint
and on the same date, the Court signed a Decree reciting
the default of Defendant, \vllite, Green and Addison
.\.ssociates, Inc., cancelling the lease of said Defendant on
certain 1nining clalins and quieting title in the mining
rlaims in Defendant, E. B. Yakes. On July 29, 1957, Defendant, \Yitite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc.,
moved to quash the officers~ returns of serYice of process
dated October :.!, 1956, and ~larch 19, 1951. and further
JJIOYPd to set a~ide the Decree and \Yrit of Possession
l'111 pred b~· the Trial Court April16. 1951. On September
:2.), I !l:>l, Defendant, \Yhite, Green and Addison ~\ssoci
a tl'~, lne., filed an ~\n~wer to Plaintiffs C01nplaint and a
Proposed .Answer to the Cross-c01nplaint of Defendant,
]~. B. Yakes. Plaintiffs and Defendant, E. B. Yakes,
~<'rV<'d notice on counsel for \\~hite, Green and Addison

..-\~~oeiatPs, Jne., that on Nove1nber I. 1D51. at the hearing
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on the Defendant's Motion to Quash Return of Service
of Process and to Set Aside Decree and Writ of Possession, they would request the Court for leave to amend
the returns and proofs of service of process and for an
order permitting the amended returns of service of process to be filed in the action nunc pro tunc as of the
date of the original returns. Following the hearing which
had been continued to December 10, 1957, the Court
denied the Defendant's motions. The Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the
filing of another amended return of service of process.
Defendant's motion to set aside the findings of fact and
<'onclusions of law was denied February 18, 1958.
At the hearing the parties stipulated that White,
Green and Addison Associates, Inc., was a foreign corporation not qualified to do business within the state of
Utah (Tr. 6). Attorney William Ela of Grand Junction,
Colorado, then testified that he accompanied Deputy
Sheriff R. D. McAllister of San Juan County on March 18,
1957 to the Hop Creek area where the purported service
of summons was made on the Defendant. Upon arriving
at the Hop Creek area, Sheriff McAllister took two copies
of the summons and two copies of the answer and Crosscomplaint together with the attached exhibits and put a
rubber stamp on them to show who was making the
service, the date of service and his title (Tr. 7). The
attorney testified that they had never been able to serve
the Defendant in Denver, Colorado, ( Tr. 10), although
an effort had been made (Tr. 8); that he had discovered
the corporation had no process agent in the state of
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Utah (Tr. 11). The attorney testified he took a photograph on a prior occasion of a sign posted at the entrance
to the li:op Creek property identifying it as being worked
by White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc. and that
he saw the same sign on ~larch 18, 1957 ( Tr. 13). He
testified to a conversation in the presence of the Deputy
Sheriff and the jeep driver with a man named Bottomley,
which gentleman wore a badge on his hat identifying
himself with Defendant, White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc. ( Tr. 15). The Sheriff first handed the
papers to :.Mr. Bottomley and Ela stated that he asked
Bottomley what his name was and he identified himself.
Bottomley ·was then asked if he was in charge of the
property and he replied he was the foreman. He was
asked whether he worked for White, Green and Addison
Associates, Inc., and he replied that he did. He \Ya:3
asked if there was any person of higher authority than
hi1nself in charge of the property to which he answered
that there \Yas not. He was asked from whom he received
his pay checks and he answered that he received them
from the Trans \Y orld Mining Corporation, but was
allegedly confused about whether there \Yas one or two
<'orporations (Tr. 16). At this tune the attorney took a
picture of a sign on a trailer identifying it as being
the property of \Yhih\ Green and . A. ddison ~\ssociates.
In e....:\ t torney Ela stated he asked Bottmnley what he
and the other 1nen were doing in the way of work and
BottomlPy said that eyerything was going yery satisl'a<'torilY. to him, but that if he wanted anY
. detailed
i7J"I'onnation, he would have to get it frmn the officers
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of the corporation in the Boston Building in Denver
(Tr. 17).
On cross-examination, the attorney stated that in
October of 1956, he had been on the same property
and found there present a man who identified himself
as Miller who stated that he was foreman (Tr. 18). The
attorney had made this trip to determine whether White,
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. was still in possession of the mining claims and to see what the status
of their workings were on the ground. The attorney
denied that he had seen Miller on the property in March
of 1957 (Tr. 20), although he admitted that Miller could
have been one of the men in the group of workmen. The
attorney did not inquire of Bottomley as to the whereabouts of Mr. Miller (Tr. 22) nor did he inquire of
Bottomley as to where he obtained his authority. The
attorney stated that Bottomley appeared to be confused
as to the distinction between White, Green and Addison
Associates, Inc. and another corporation, Trans World
Mining Corporation (Tr. 22).
Deputy Sheriff Raymond McAllister first testified
that he was unable to recall clearly any conversation
except when Mr. Bottomley didn't want Mr. Ela to take
a picture of the trailer on the property (Tr. 25). When
prompted by his counsel (Tr. 26), the Deputy Sheriff
was able to recall that Mr. Bottomley told Mr. Ela that
he was foreman for both White ,Green and Addison Associates, Inc. and Trans World Mining Corporation. On
cross-examination the Deputy Sheriff testified that in
July of 1956 he was on the same property at which time
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he was informed that a 1\ir. H_ank Miller was superintendent (Tr. 27). l-Ie stated that he did not know prior
to March 18, 1957 that Bottomley was foreman of the
property (Tr. 28) and had no knowledge as to Bottomley's capacity with the Defendant company prior to
that date; that he did not ask whether any officer or
other agent was present other than Bottomley because
it didn't matter much to him (Tr. 29), nor did he ask
Bottomley where he got his authority; that he heard
Bottomley state that he was foreman for both outfits
in answer to Mr. Ela's question; that he could not recall
on March 18, 1957 whether he asked of the whereabouts
of :Jir. niiller, but believed that he did not (Tr. 30).

Attorney F. Bennion Redd testified that he was consulted by ~Ir. Miles White, an officer of the Defendant,
White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., and asked
to settle two law suits by paying certain claims (Tr. 36).
An attempt had previously been made to show that the
papers in the two law suits had been served on ~Ir.
Bottmnley (Tr. 33), but the testiinony to this effect was
objected to and the objection sustained by the Court
(Tr. 33). On cross examination Mr. Redd stated that
he had never entered an appearance in either case on
behalf of \ Yh ite, Green and .L-\ddison ~lssociates, Inc.
( Tr. ;~s), nor discussed with his client. agency or the
authoritY of the person seiTed in the 1natter. He stated
he did not know who was served in the 1natter.
Defendant called Mr. Carl J. Bott01nley who testil'iPd that on the occasion when :J[r. Ela and Deputy
Nlu•ril'f l\lcAlli8ter eame to llop Creek he was present
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in camp with three other employees (Tr. 41) and that
he recalled the deputy stating that he had some papers
for him. He recalled receiving the papers and the subsequent conversations respecting the taking of a picture
of the trailer, but could recall no conversation with Mr.
Ela respecting the papers (Tr. 41). He stated that he
stuck the papers in a suit case and forgot about then1
(Tr. 41). He stated that his job on :March 18, 195'1 was
that of handyman or general laborer (Tr. 42); that J.Vlr.
Hank Miller was supervisor at the camp and that he did
what Mr. Miller told him to; that Mr. Miller was his
boss. He stated he had no conversation with Mr. Miller
respecting the receipt of the papers nor with any officer
of the company (Tr. 42). He stated that he was employed
by vVhite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., in August
of 1956, but that he was never employed by Trans World
Mining Corporation. He stated that when he was sent
to Hop Creek from Denver, he was informed that Mr.
Miller would be superintendent of the camp (Tr. 43).
He stated that he notified no one concerning the papers
served upon him, but a month prior to the hearing while
unpacking at another camp, he found them (Tr. 44).
He stated that he had never been involved in Court proceedings and didn't think the papers were important
('Tr. 45). He denied that he had told Mr. Ela he was
foreman of the camp and stated he had never represented
to the Sheriff that he was foreman (Tr. 45); that he
was never left in charge of the camp (Tr. 46).
On cross-examination :Mr. Bottomley stated that
Hank Miller had left camp the night before March 18,
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1957 (Tr. 48), and that he didn't know where he was
going. Bottomley again denied that he told ~Ir. Ela that
he was in charge of the camp on that date (Tr. 48); that
he was engaged in cooking on the date the process was
served. l-Ie stated that he saw 1:Iiller a couple of days
after March 18th, but that he didn't tell ~Iiller about
the service of papers because he didn't think it was
important (Tr. 51). He stated he had been served with
papers three or four times and that all the papers given
to him he had kept in his suit case until about a month
before the hearing (Tr. 52). He did not lmow how \Yhite,
U reen and Addison Associates, Inc. had found out about
other law suits. He stated that his authority was only
that of a common laborer (Tr. 5±) even though he had
told :\Ir. Ela to get off the property; he explained that
the men understood that nobody was to trespass (Tr.
3-t). He stated that in January he was on the property
when the Sheriff made an attachn1ent of certain personal
property (Tr. 57).
On re-direct examination ~lr. Bottmnley testified
that on no occasion did he recall the Sheriff asking
whether he was fore1nan or in charge of the camp, and
that at all tiines while he was there he received his
in~trudions frmn ~lr. ~[iller (Tr. 38). On re-cross examination, ~~ r. Bott01nley stated that he believed at one time
he told t ht> Sheriff that he couldn't accept papers then
~('1'\'Pd on hhn lweanse he didn't haY(:"' any responsibility
(Tr. f>!)).
1\1 r. II Pll ry 1\1 illt"'r. called by Defendant, testified that
h(' had ht>t>n e1nployed by \Yhitf•. Green and Addison
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Associates, Inc. for about 18 months on the Hop Creek
property and was property superintendent (Tr. 60);
that in March of 1957, he was living at the Hop Creek
property and that he left the camp for periods of a day
or two at a time to attend meetings ( Tr. 62) ; that in
July of 1956 he had a conversation with Sheriff Seth
Wright in which he told the Sheriff he was in charge
of the property at Hop Creek (Tr. 64); that a similar
conversation occurred in the presence of Deputy McAllister (Tr. 64) ; that he was appointed superintendent
of the property by Miles White; that he never at any
time had a conversation with Mr. Bottomley regarding
the receipt of any papers (Tr. 65); that as general superintendent he kept reports and saw that the rnen got the
work done (Tr. 67); that he first learned of this law
suit in June of 1957 when Sheriff Seth Wright said he
was going to come out and throw them off the property
in ten days (Tr. 67).
Mr. Miles White, called by Defendant, testified that
he was president of White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., ( Tr. 68) ; that he hired Bottomley as a general
laborer in Denver, ·Colorado, approximately a year and a
half prior to the hearing; that Bottomley never held any
other position with the company than general laborer (Tr.
69); that Bottomley was instructed upon his being hired
that he would be placed in a camp under a foreman
or superintendent and that he would follow that man's
instructions explicitly (Tr. 70); that Henry Miller was
placed in charge of the Hop Creek camp about the 1st
of July, 1956, and had remained in charge of the camp
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from that date until the hearing; that he first had
knowledge of the commencement of this action about
August 1, 1957 (Tr. 72); that J\!Ir. Bottomley never
informed him that an action had been commenced, nor
did Mr. Miller inform him of the action (Tr. 73); that
he was informed of the commencement of the action
by an attorney in Denver, Colorado; that he then contacted Utah counsel with respect to handling the matter.
~Ir. White testified to a conversation July 1st or 2nd,
1956, at the Hop Creek Camp at which Sheriff Setl1
Wright and some state police and the camp crew were
present and at that time Mr. Henry Miller had been
introduced to the sheriff as camp superintendent (Tr.
75).
On cross examination, ~Ir. White testified that
\Yhite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., was a Colorado corporation and that the company had an office at
:n1 Boston Building in Denver, Colorado (Tr. 79). When
questioned concerning receipt of a letter dated October
19, 1957, he stated it had not been received (Tr. 80).
He stated that the first notice he received of an attachInent of certain property by the sheriff of San Juan
Count~· was when he telephoned the c01npany's creditor
to pa~· tlw obligation (Tr. 8~): that he did not call
I>Ppll t ~· ~ltt>ri ff ~I c..:\ 11 i~h'r regarding the attaclunent
within twPnty-fonr hours of that eYPnt (Tr. S~)): that
:\I r .. \ddison. his as~oeiah.'. did not telephone the sheriff's

ol'l'i<'<' or Jw would haYt' known of it; that :Jir. Green
was not <'Olls<'ions of thr· matter at all. ::\Ir. 'Yhite then
<rasP

t"l

the' naml's and addresses of the officers of the
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company and stated that his first inkling of this law suit
was in July or August of 1957 while passing through
Monticello (Tr. 86); that Henry Miller had advised him
that the Sheriff was going to evict the company frmn
the Hop Creek property within ten days; that it was on
that occasion that an attorney was contacted.
Mr. White was asked on re-direct examination concerning the residence of Mr. Jervis, the party served with
the original Complaint in this matter by Plaintiffs. He
testified that Mr. Jervis was employed by the Defendant
company as a general laborer (Tr. 89), and that the
address where service was purportedly made, 3256
vVyandotte Street, Denver, Colorado, was the residence
of one Jack Hennessey, another employee; that employees of the company in the field would stay at ~Ir.
Hennessey's home when in Denver (Tr. 90); that the
first conversation he had had with Mr. Jervis regarding
service of papers was that morning (December 10, 1957) ;
that Mr. Jervis had never contacted him or his company
regarding this action prior to that time; that Jervis
never gave him any papers served upon Jervis in this
action (Tr. 91). On re-cross examination White stated
that 3256 Wyandotte Street in Denver was a residential
building.
Mr. Richard Malcolm Jervis then testified that during
the month of October, 1956, he was employed by Defendant company; that he was at 3256 Wyandotte Street

in Denver during October 1956 when an attempt to
serve some papers was made on him (Tr. 93); that a
fellow knocked on the door and asked him who he was ;
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that he told him his name and in turn asked him who
he was, and he produced credentials from the sheriff's
office; that the officer asked Jervis if he worked for
White, Green and Addison, and Jervis answered that
he did; that the officer had papers in his hand and said
"I-I ere" ; that Jervis answered '"I'm sorry, I can't take
those"; that the officer asked, '" \Vhy not:"; that Jervis
answered, "I don't want to risk my job. I have no
authority to accept papers or whatever you have there''
(Tr. 94); that the officer 'vent on to explain that the
papers were legal process and that Jervis was authorized
to take the~n; that the officer hit him in the chest with
the papers while he was standing at his normal stance;
that the papers dropped to the front porch; that Jervis
stated he wasn't going to pick them up and the officer
stated, "It doesn't make any difference to me. They have
been served, you can leave them there"; that the officer
then walked off the porch and Jervis walked back into
the residence; that he never picked the papers up; that
he told Hennessey what had happened, at the same time
going out the back exit of the residence to n1eet a
party he was expecting, that he had seen neither :Jir.
Addison or ::\Ir. \Yhite, the only officers of the corporation he knew, sinee the previous smn1ner; that he informed no one of the serYire of the papers except :Jir.
II pnnP~~PY at that thne: that he did not know \Yhat the
papPr~ "·prp: that he had nf'YC'r held any position with

the <·ompan~· other than general laborer (Tr. 96).
l\1 r. l\1 e ~\ 11 i~h'r, called by Plaintiff as a rebuttal
witness, testified that after the attaclunent of the
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property on Hop Creek he received a telephone call
within the next day (Tr. 97).
Cpon the foregoing testimony the Trial Court upheld the validity of service of process by Cross-complainant, E. B. Yakes, upon vVhite, Green and Addison
Associates, Inc., by virtue of the delivery of papers
by Deputy Sheriff R. D. McAllister to Carl J. Bottomley
at Hop Creek, La Sal, Utah, specifically finding that
Bottomley was foreman in charge of all of the White,
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. properties in the
Hop Creek area and that there was no person of higher
authority in the employ of White, Green and Addison
Associates, Inc. upon whom service could be had in
San Juan County, nor in the state of Utah at the time
of such service. Findings were also made that the Defendant corporation was doing business within the state
of Utah without qualifying and that there was no officer,
managing or general agent, or other agent authorized
by appointment or law to receive service of process, and
that since no such officer or agent was found in San
Juan County, Utah, by the Sheriff after diligent search
that service upon Bottomley as an agent having the
management, direction and control of the properties of
·said corporation was a sufficient compliance with the
provisions of Rule 4 (e) (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Court further found that actual knowledge of
the service of process upon Bottomley reached the Defendant corporation in sufficient time to allow the
Defendant to properly protect itself before the Court
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and that actual knowledge of the pendency of the action
was received by the corporation as a result of service
of process by the Sheriff of the City and County of
Denver, Colorado, upon Richard Jervis even though said
service was not essential to the determination of the
issue before the Court; that the amended return of
service signed by Seth F. Wright, Sheriff of San Juan
County, should be filed, nunc pro tunc, as of the date
of the filing of the original return of service so that the
return of service might "speak the truth" as to the service
made upon the Defendant.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the Court ordered that the Defendant's :.Jiotion
to Quash Service of Process and to Set Aside Decree
and Writ of Possession be denied and that the amended
return of service dated ~farch 19, 1957, be ordered filed
nunc pro tunc as of the date of the filing of the original
return of service. The Court made no findings or order
with respect to the ~lotion to Quash the Service of
Plaintiff's Complaint on Richard Jervis.
STATE!\IENTS OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
SET ASIDE DECREE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION AS TO
THE ·CROSS-COMPLAINT, SINCE THE FINDINGS WERE
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OR
WERE MANIFESTLY CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED BY
ERROR OF LAW.
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POINT II.
ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO MAKE FINDINGS
AND ENTER ITS ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT COMPANY AND
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
SET ASIDE DECREE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION AS TO
THE ·CROSS-COMPLAINT, SINCE THE FINDINGS WERE
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OR
WERE MANIFESTLY CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED BY
ERROR OF LAW.

It has been stated by good authority that a Supreme
Court cannot, in a law case, review the findings of the
trial judge on the question of the existence of an agency
which will sustain a service of process unless they were
wholly unsupported by the evidence, or were manifestly
controlled or influenced by error of law. Bass v.
Ameri·can Products Export & Import Corp., 30 ALR 168,
124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594. It will be our purpose in this
argument to show that the findings of the trial court
in this case were based upon incompetent evidence or
manifestly controlled or influenced by error of law.
General principles with respect to service upon an
agent by implication of law are set out by the text
writer at 30 ALR 176. It is noted that in dealing with
service of process on an agent, especially in case the
process is directed against a foreign corporation, the
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Court is confronted with the question whether due process of law is being allowed to the party Defendant;
for, as the service of process goes to the jurisdiction
of the Court over the person, the word "'agent", as
·used in the statute authorizing service of process on
agents of foreign corporations, must be so construed
as to conform with principals of natural justice, so
that the service will constitute due process of law.
In cases discussing the sufficiency of service of
process on a person in the employment of the party
named in the writ, the Courts have, in general, taken
the view that the agent must be one whose connection
with the company is such, or whose employment is of such
character, that it would be implied that he had authority
to receive service of process, and would be likely to
infonn the party of the service.
The United States Supreme Court has said that in
the absence of any express authority given to a person to
receive service of process on behalf of a foreign corporation, the question as to whether the service upon such
person is sufficient service upon the corporation depends
upon a review of the surrounding facts, and upon the
inferences which the Court n1ight properly draw therefroin; and if it appears that there is a law of the
state in respect to the service of process on foreign
corporations and that the character of the agency is
such as to render it fair, reasonable, and just to imply
an authority on the part of the agent to receive such
service, the law will and ought to draw such inference
and imply such authority, and service under such cirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cmnstances upon a person of that character would be
sufficient. Conn. Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Spratley (1899) 172 U.S. 602, 43 L. Ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct.
308. As stated at 42 Am. Jur. Process Sec. 10'7, pg. 93,
''The fundamental object of all laws relating to service
of process is to give that notice which will, in the nature
of things, most likely bring the attention of the corporation to the commencement of proceedings against it."
The <1uestion, then, in this case is whether the
character of the agent served was such as to imply an
authority on his part to receive service on behalf of
the corporation, or, more precisely, was Botton1ley an
agent within the 1neaning of Rule -1: (e) (4) l:tah Rules
of Civil Procedure which states in part, "If no such
officer or agent can be found in the county in which
the action is brought, then (service may be had) upon
any such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing
agent, chief clerk or other agent having the management, direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated
association within the state". At 18 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec. 8737, it is stated, "What persons come
'Within the meaning of the term 'agent' has been the
subject of much discussion. However, the word 'agent'
in a statute authorizing service of process on an agent
of a foreign corporation does not mean every man who
is entrusted with a commission or employment, but
designates the principal officers of the corporation who
either generally or in respect to some particular department of the corporate business have a controlling
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authority either general or special.*** He must be its
representative within the jurisdiction, either as acting
therein on its behalf by its authority, or as expressly
or impliedly authorized by it to receive service.*** In
other words, the 'other agent' must possess some of the
powers possessed by the persons named immediately
}Jreceding the phrase, 'or other agent'". In short, the
rule of ejusdem generis should be applied to a statute
such has been enacted in Utah and the words ""or other
agent having the management, direction or control of
any property of such corporation, partnership, or other
unincorporated association within the state", should be
construed in the light of the phrases immediately preceding.
As will be noted, the rule names as a superior class
upon whom service can be made, an "officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process'~.
The inferior class is then listed as follows, '•If no such
officer or agent can be found in the county in which
the action is brought, then upon any such officer or
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk
or other agent having the n1anagen1ent direction or
control of any property of such corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association within the
state". The use of the word "such" in the rule would
seem to clearly refer the reader back to the general
tenor of the preceding sentence and require that the
person ~PrvPd have son1e of the characteristics of the
general or 1nanaging agent.
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The Utah Rule on service of process on corporations is unlike the Federal Rule in that the Federal
Rule does not contain the portion of the rule upon which
service in this case is founded. We are thus unable to
refer to federal cases which have construed the portion
of the rule in question. In Boston Acme Mines Development Company v. Clawson, 66 Utah 103, 240 Pac. 165,
the Supreme Court of this state had occasion to construe
the statute in effect at that time which provided that
service of a foreign corporation must be made on the
"president, secretary, treasurer or other officer thereof
or on the person designated by such corporation as one
upon whom process may be served." If no such person
could be found, "then upon any clerk, superintendent,
general agent, cashier, principal director, ticket agent,
station keeper, or other agent having the management,
direction or control of any property of such corporation,
company or association." In that case, the sheriff served
an inferior agent of the Boston Acme Mines Development Company, a Mr. M. K. Heavner, and the Defendant
challenged the sufficiency of the service, first, on the
ground that the return did not show what kind of an
agent Heavner was, and second, even if he were agent
upon whom service could be made, such service could
not have been made until efforts had been diligently
made to find and serve the president, the secretary,
treasurer or other person of the superior class named
in the statute. The Court sustained the defendant and
held the agent upon whom service was made must be
such as is named in the statute; otherwise, the service
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is insufficient. In a later case, Reader v. District Court,
98 Utah 1, 94 P. 2nd 858, the secretary of a corporation was served by delivering a copy of the process to
his wife, and the Court found that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation and that the judgment
rendered against the corporation was void. These Utah
cases emphasize the need for strict compliance with the
statute involved.
In the instant case, the Trial Court made a finding
that Bottomley was foreman of Defendant corporation
in charge of the property at Hop Creek. The testimony
of Attorney El~ and Deputy :McAllister as to the agency
of Bottomley was accepted in the face of contradictory
testimony by ~Ir. Bottomley, ~fr. White and :Jlr. :Jiiller.
Whether the Supreme Court is bound by the findings
of the Trial Court in this respect will be hereafter
discussed, but it should be emphasized that if Bottomley's testimony were, in fact, true, and the process
served upon him put in a trunk until approxnnately a
month before the hearing on :Motion to Quash Service,
Defendant has 1nost certainly been deprived of its
propert~· without due process of law·.
been stated. generan~~~ that the person served
with ]H'<H'C'~~ Hmst be, instead of a 1nere subordinate
Plllplo~·pp \rithout discretion, one regularly employed,
having sonw <'hargp or 1neasure of control oYer the busin pss <'II t ru~ t Pd to hiln or of son1e feature thereof, and he
n1ust hP of sufficient character and rank as to afford
It

ha~

reasonable assurance that he will cmmnunicate to his
comptw~·

the fact that the process has been seiTed upon
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him. Whvteh1trst v. Kerr (1910) 153 N.C. 76, 68 S.E.
913; J. B. Blades Lumber Company v. Finance Co. of
America (1933) 204 N.C. 285, 168 S.E. 219. There would
seem to be little assurance, if any, that a camp cook,
who had never completed his secondary education ( Tr.
58) and who had never himself been involved in a legal
proceeding, would communicate the fact of service to
his company.
We are aware that the Trial Court found Bottomley to be foreman at Hop Creek, and if he had been such,
perhaps the service in this case would have complied
with the statutory requirements. But the evidence supporting that finding is not sufficient to uphold it since
it was apparently based wholly upon the alleged declaration of the agent himself that he was "foreman." This
evidence is incompetent and is the only evidence in the
record of Bottomley being anything but a laborer,
subject to the immediate supervision of :Mr. ..'Hiller who
was at all times within the state of Utah and in charge
of Hop Creek.
As a general rule, the admissions, statements, and
declarations of one alleged to be the agent of another,
other than his testin1ony in the case in which the issue
arises, are not admissible either to prove the fact of
his agency or the extent of his authority as an agent,
20 Am. Jur. Evidence Sec. 598, pg. 508. This rule is for
the protection of the party whom it is sought to bind
as principal. In other words, the agency sought to be
established must, prima facie, be proved jndependently
of the declaration of the alleged agent. If this require-
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ment be met, then the declarations become admissible
in corrorboration only where they constitute a part of
the res gestae and were made at the time of the transaction in question. Jameson v. B'i·rst Savings Bank &
Trust Co., 103 ALR 1492, 40 N.l\L 133, 55 P. 2nd 743.
While the employrnent of Bottomley by the Defendant may have been established independently of Bottomley's declaration, and thus, Bottomley's state1nent,
as narrated by Ela and Deputy McAllister, may have
been admissible to show the nature of Bottomley's
authority, the Trial Court did more than admit the evidence. It made the declaration the basis for its finding
of the quality of agency required by the e tah Rules
of Civil Procedure in the absence of any competent
corroborative testimony. This is the very thing the
courts have said cannot be done. Bass r. American Prodttcts Export and Import Corp., supra.
What evidence is there in this case tending to
establish an agency on the part of Bottomley more than
that of mere etnployment, except his own alleged declaration Y The sheriff had obtained personal knowledge
a short time before that the superintendent of the
property was a n1an named Henry Miller whmn he Imffi\r
by sight. The officer of the corporation who appointed
Bottomley e1nployed hun as a general laborer only.
Nothing about the signs on the property or the badges
worn hy the men identified Bottomley as foren1an or in
charge. The evidence respecting settle1nent of certain
<'laim~ on which suit had been brought in other actions
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and in which actions service had allegedly been made
on Bottomley, is hardly the type of evidence to support
an agency in view of the fact that the corporation
never at any time appeared in the actions and in view
of Mr. White's uncontradicted testimony that he first
learned of the attachment of property in one of the other
actions in a telephone conversation with the company's
creditor after the attachment occurred. The Trial Court's
finding was obviously based on incompetent evidence
or controlled or influenced by error of law, the error
of law being a belief by the court that the alleged declaration of Bottomley was sufficient alone.
POINT II.
ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO MAKE FINDINGS
AND ENTER ITS ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT COMPANY AND
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT.

What has been said with respect to the service
on Bottomley of the Answer and Cross-Complaint can
be said with respect to the service of the complaint on
Jervis, the Denver employee, with the added observation
that there was no testimony of alleged declarations pertaining to that attempted service. All of the evidence
at the hearing supported a finding that Jervis was an
inferior employee, without any authority sufficient to
bring him within the definition of "other agent" as required by statute.
The Trial oCourt should have found that the service
of the Complaint on Jervis was insufficient, and on this
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ground, should have quashed the return of service of
process and set aside the default entered by the Clerk
of the Court.
Actual notice of the pendency of the action acquired
by corporate officers, even if this fact were shown,
would not be sufficient to sustain a service of process
clearly invalid under the statute in view of the strict
compliance of the statute required by our Court. See
Reader v. District Court, supra.
CONCLL"SIOX
'This case points up the dangers inherent in attempting service of process on corporations by delivery of
the papers to inferior employees. \Y e are unable to
estimate how many times inadequate service is actually
allowed to pass in our courts because unchallenged by
the corporate Defendant, but we suspect that it occurs
quite frequently. \Yhen challenged, this type of inadequate service should be quashed in the interests of
natural justice and the parties seeking to acquire jurisdiction be directed to c01nply strictly "ith the statute
as construed In the light of the require1nents for due
proces~.

Hespectfully subn1itted.
t~HEEX\YOOD ~-\.XD 8\Y~\X

and ALLEX :Jl. S\V~\X
Attorneys fm· Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

